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Conflict, Crisis and Confusion in Pennsylvania
Albert A. Ehrenzweig*
The three pejoratives in the title of this paper were the battle cry
which Brainerd Currie, one of the outstanding scholars of American
conflicts law, raised in 1963 with regard to a series of New York deci-
sions in this area.' Shortly thereafter, Gerhard Kegel, one of the leading
conflicts authors on the international scene, found all of American
conflicts law to be immersed in a severe crisis.2 As for myself---even
then I shared Currie's unhappiness about a misguided theory which,
having arisen from the fluid and largely academic playgrounds of torts
and contracts, had been permitted by the New York court to create
such very human tragedies as that of the "bastard" denied his right to
a father under a foreign law.3 And today I would unhappily conclude
that ever since, New York has continued along this dangerous path.4
But for other states I have always maintained that, if a crisis exists, it
has remained limited to the conflicts law of enterprise liability where
it is due to the critical posture of the substantive law in this area. 5 Here
we are faced with the incongruity between the search for an equitable
distribution of unavoidable losses and its disingenuous tool of a tort
liability designed to achieve avoidance of such losses by the potential
wrongdoer's admonition. 6 So long as this irrational law of admonition
# Dr. Jur., University of Vienna, 1928; J. D., University of Chicago, 1941; LL.M.,
Columbia University, 1942; J. S. D., Columbia University, 1952. Walter Perry Johnson
Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley; Honorarprofessor of Conflict of Laws,
University of Vienna.
1. Currie, 1963 DuKE L.J. 1, reprinted in SELEcrED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
690 (1963).
2. Kegel, The Crisis of Conflict of Laws, Academy of International Law, RECUEiL DES
Couas 112 (1954) 93.
3. Ehrenzweig, The Bastard in the Conflict of Laws-A National Disgrace, 29 U. CHI.
L. REV. 498 (1962).
4. We now have similar New York inroads even into the law of property. For docu-
mentation see Ehrenzweig and Westen, Fraudulent Conveyances in the Conflict of Laws:
Easy Cases May Make Bad Law, 66 MIcH. L. REy. 1679 (1968); also EHRENZWEIG, PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW 21, 63, 70, 142, 151 (1967). That the New York free-for-all in tort
law has continued, has been generally noted, in this country as well as abroad. See, e.g.,
Jayme, Rabels 34 (1970) 141, 142, with regard to Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249
N.E.2d 394 (1969).
5. Older contract cases such as the fateful New York decision in Auten v. Auten, 308
N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954) which ushered in the "new era," are but harmless reflec-
tions of the general and age-old "proper-law" anarchy in what unhappily is still treated
as a homogeneous "subject." See now also e.g. such "landmark" cases in other jurisdictions
as Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 239 Ore. 1, 395 P.2d 543 (1964); and generally Ehrenzweig, The
Not so "Proper" Law of a Tort: "Pandora's Box," 17 I.C.L.Q. 17 (1968).
6. See, e.g., Ehrenzweig, Specific Principles of Private Transnational Law, Academy
of International Law, RECUEIL DES CoURs 125 (1968) ch. VII (hereafter cited R.CUEIL).
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for "fault" is not replaced by a rational scheme of compensation with-
out fault, any conflicts rule must choose between two irrational laws
and will, therefore, continue to remain irrational.7 Indeed, the alleged
crisis, except for what I have characterized as the general Desperanto
of the Second Conflicts Restatement8 and for the unfortunate experi-
ments of New York, has with an almost exasperating regularity, been
virtually limited to such very specific problems of an obsolescent enter-
prise liability as guest statutes, limitations of damages, and family and
charitable immunities. But the present case, though it does, of course,
as nearly all cases of this kind, reach a wholly defensible decision on the
merits, may regrettably signify a dramatic spread of Currie's "Conflict,
Crisis and Confusion" from New York into the important jurisdiction
of Pennsylvania.
In their kindness to both me and my readers, the editors have per-
mitted me to state this presumptuous view by mere conclusions and to
rely for documentation primarily upon my earlier all-too voluminous
writings in this area. These include, in addition to four general trea-
tises,9 and some one hundred articles on related topics, three papers
discussing the specific problem here involved.10 This problem is the
applicability of a foreign guest statute to the claim of a forum domicil-
iary whose law would have permitted common law recovery.
When first surveying the conflicts law bearing on this problem in
1960, I found that, presumably under the continuing influence of the
(First) Restatement, twelve jurisdictions had on occasion applied guest
statutes of foreign places of accident in preference to their own com-
mon law rule.11 Of those states, the large majority have since abandoned
this practice. We should have expected Pennsylvania to join the grow-
7. See e.g., EHRENZWEIG, NEGLIGENCE WrrHOUT FAULT (1951), reprinted 54 CALIF. L.
REV. 1419 (1966).
8. Ehrenzweig, DAS DESPERANTO DES ZWEITEN "RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS,"
IUs PRIVATUM GENTIuM, FESTSCHRIFT FOR MAX RHEINSTEIN (1969) 343; Ehrenzweig, The
"Most Significant Relationship" in the Conflicts Law of Torts: Law and Reason versus
the Restatement Second, 28 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 700 (1963); Ehrenzweig, The Second
Conflicts Restatement: A Last Appeal for its Withdrawal, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1230 (1965).
See also, infra note 10.
9. EHRENZWEIG, TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAwS § 220 (1962) (hereafter cited
TREATISE); EHRENZWEIG, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw § 40 (1967) (hereafter cited PIL);
RECUEIL § 117; EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICTS IN A NUTSHELL § 89 (2d ed. 1970) (hereafter cited
NUTSHELL).
10. Ehrenzweig, Guest Statutes in the Conflict of Laws-Towards a Theory of Enter-
prise Liability under "Foreseeable and Insurable Laws," 69 YALE L.J. 595 (1960);
Ehrenzweig, Foreign Guest Statutes and Forum Accidents: Against the Desperanto of
State "Interests", 68 COLUM. L. REV. 49 (1968). See also Ehrenzweig, Comment, 63 CoLuM.
L. REV. 1243 (1963).
11. 69 Yale L.J., supra note 10 at 602.
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ing consensus after her earlier forays against the regime of the lex
loci.1 But the present case seems to betray this expectation. For the
reasoning of the majority, though rejecting Justice Bell's renewed
advocacy of the lex loci,13 in effect returns to it by a tortuous detour:
A Pennsylvania citizen is denied recovery under the guest statute of
the state of the accident-(l) because of a prevailing "interest" of that
state; (2) because of the court's "highly territorial approach;" (3) be-
cause the defendant deserved protection; (4) because the car was ga-
raged and insured in the state of the accident; and (5) because there
was no room for the application of the "better rule."
1. We are to understand that the court reached its conclusion for
the defendant under the lex loci of Delaware because that state had
"the greater interest in having its law applied" than Pennsylvania. 14
(a) By thus weighing state interests the court purports to adhere to
the technique it adopted in the Griffith case.15 Like Chief 'Justice
Traynor 8 and other distinguished judges before and after him, Justice
Roberts, in that case, transposed into his state's non-governmental tort
conflicts law that language which the United States Supreme Court
had introduced in cases which were fundamentally distinguishable as
involving truly governmental interests. 17 This transposition remained
harmless and, indeed, may have often assisted courts in reaching de-
sired and desirable results by applying their own law.'8 The Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court itself used this technique in those three cases on
which it now relies.19 But in contrast to these cases, the majority of the
12. See above all, Justice Roberts' scholarly opinion in Griffith v. United Air Lines,
416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796, 800-807 (1964). Having in mind Justice Bell's prophetic warning
of "confusion or chaos" (id. 807, 809), we must regret that the courts did not replace the
lex loci by another "clear and definite and well settled rule" (id. at 807). Such a rule
would have to be based on the interpretation of the forum's substantive law, e.g. to the
effect that the policy of the Pennsylvania common law rule on damages did or did not
require any limitation based on the law of the place of accident or domicile.
13. Cipolla v. Shaposka, 439 Pa. 563, 267 A.2d 854, 857 (1970), dissent.
14. Id. at 857.
15. Griffith v. United Air Lines, supra note 12.
16. See Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727 (1967). In this case the court
purported to apply the Ohio common law rule of unlimited wrongful death damages
as against the limitation rule of Missouri, the state of the accident, in litigation between
California citizens. A prevailing "interest" of Ohio as the state of the decedent's domicile
was assumed, although Ohio herself would have applied Missouri law. Interpretation of
the forum rule as applicable to this case would have led to the same result without mis-
directing California courts in future cases. See Ehrenzweig, Comment, 15 U.C.L.A. L.
Rrv. 570 (1968).
17. See, NuTsHELL § 8-5.
18. The only "interest" case in which a foreign guest statute was applied in New
York, has been duly overruled. See the history in Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249
N.E.2d 394 (1969), relied on by the Cipolla majority, at 856.
19. These are Kuchinic v. McCrory, 422 Pa. 620, 222 A.2d 897 (1966); McSwain v.
461
Duquesne Law Review
court now further distorts the United States Supreme Court's original
"interest" doctrine by using it in explaining the application of foreign
law.
(b) As I have tried to show many times, application of a foreign
law on grounds of another state's prevailing "interest" could, in the
absence of a rule of choice of law to this effect, be justified only on the
basis of a super-law such as a constitutional command or an interna-
tional rule. But such super-laws, while once assumed as "vesting" rights
or conferring "legislative jurisdiction," have long been recognized as
illusory assumptions of an utopian private "international" law.20
(c) Without such a super-law, then, the court had no reason, and
indeed no excuse for considering a priori any "interest" of Delaware.
Yet, that state was said to be "concerned" 21 because defendant was "a
Delaware resident." 22 Asking ourselves why such residence was "a con-
tact relevant to the issue," we learn of Delaware's "policy that its
hosts should not be required to compensate their guests for their (the
hosts's) negligence.123 In other words: Delaware is "concerned" because
her "contact" is "relevant," and this contact is relevant because Delaware
is concerned. Let us assume that the car had been garaged and insured
in New York. Would this "contact" have been "relevant to the issue"
so as to activate New York's policy as that of a concerned state? Most
probably the answer would have been in the negative. But this answer
would have had to be derived from a rule of choice of law declaring
"relevant" only Delaware's rather than New York's interest, by virtue
of that very choice of law rule which we had set out to ascertain from
these states' "interests."
(d) The same circular reasoning underlies the court's concept of a
"true conflict" which was said to permit the weighing of Delaware's
interest despite the "competing" interest of Pennsylvania as the state
of the plaintiff's residence, with each state's policy being "furthered"
by the applicability of its laws. The court apparently considered this
finding necessary in order to distinguish the case from those precedents
which, faced with mere "false conflicts", reached the application of the
McSwain, 420 Pa. 86, 215 A.2d 677 (1966); Griffith v. United Air Lines, supra note 12.
See the present case, at 855.
20. See, TREATISE §§ 121-123; PIL ch. III; RECUEIL ch. IV; NUrSHELL §§ 1-14.
21. For the identity of the "concern" language, borrowed from Von Mehren and
Trautman, and "interest" terminology, see Kay, Book Review, 18 J. LEGAL Ev. 341 (1966).
22. Cipolla v. Shaposka, supra note 13, at 856.
23. Id.
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lex fori.2 4 But the concepts of both false and true conflicts as used by
the court are analytically untenable, being as circular as the concepts
of "concern," "relevance," and, for that matter, "interest. '25
2. In effect, the majority admits the futility of its interest reasoning
by its simultaneous reverter to that very, long obsolete, "territorial ap-
proach" which the "interest" theory had been designed to dislodge.26
Judge Wyzansky's saying on which the court purports to rely,27 merely
suggested that "departure from the territorial view of torts ought not
to be lightly undertaken" to justify application of a law other than
that of the forum state in which the defendant had committed a tort.28
There was no reference to a foreign territorial law. And, indeed, the
court, somewhat inconsistently to be sure, rejected Justice Bell's lex
loci as applicable only to "rules of the road. '29 No wonder that Justice
Roberts, dissenting, considered the majority's "territorial" language
"misplaced." 30
3. Elsewhere I have tried to show how Chief Justice Traynor in a
now leading case,31 though purporting to apply a wholly unrealistic
"state interest" approach, in effect builds a common-sense argument on
the interests of the litigating parties.3 2 Significantly, the majority in the
present case found itself impelled to make a similar about face. At the
climax of the court's argument we learn that "it seems only fair to
permit a defendant to rely on his home state law when he is acting
within that state." 33 For this strange conclusion, the court relies on
Cavers' statement that "by entering the state or nation, the visitor has
exposed himself to the risk of the territory and should not subject
persons living there to a financial hazard that their law had not
created. 34 This argument can have validity where forum policy can
thus be interpreted or, in our case, if the Pennsylvania common law
24. Id. at 855.
25. See Ehrenzweig, "False Conflicts" and the "Better Rule": Threat and Promise in
Multistate Tort Law, 53 VA. L. REv. 847 (1947); Peter Westen, Comment, 55 CALIF. L. REV.
74 (1967).
26. Cipolla v. Shaposka, supra note 13, at 857.
27. Id. at 857: Gordon v. Parker, 83 F. Supp. 40 (D. Mass. 1949), aff'd 178 F.2d 888
(1st Cir. 1949).
28. See, TREATISE 558.
29. See Cipolla v. Shaposka, note 13, supra at 856 n.2.
30. Id. at 859.
31. Supra note 16.
32. Justice Roberts, in Griffith v. United Air Lines, supra note 12, at 802, credits me
kindly with emphasis on this approach.
33. Cipolla v. Shaposka, supra note 13, at 856.
34. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAw PROCEss 147 (1965). See Ehrenzweig, A Counter-
Revolution in Conflicts Law: From Beale to Cavers, 80 HAuv. L. REv. 377 (1966).
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rule is held not to have been intended to protect Pennsylvania citizens
who expose themselves to the possible impact of foreign laws. But this
is the only issue and, as I have tried to show earlier, wholly unconcerned
with Delaware's policy. Could we, in the present case, seriously assume
that Pennsylvania policy would abandon her citizen to the law of a state
which has accepted him as a daily commuter? The court's attempt to
distinguish what it concedes to be the only reported case "presenting
a factual situation similar" to the present one and arriving at the con-
trary result, is an obvious failure.35
4. But, we learn, Delaware's "qualitatively greater" interest "in
having its law applied" is also based on another party interest. "The
automobile involved in the accident is registered and housed in Del-
aware [and] it appears that insurance rates will depend on the state in
which the automobile is housed."3 6 Contrary to the court's contention,37
such a "zone-risk analysis" was expressly denied, rather than asserted,
by Professor Morris with regard to the incidence of guest statutes, 3 8 in
contradiction to what he erroneously considered my suggestion which,
internationally, has half-jokingly come to be known as my advocacy of
a "lex loci stabuli."39 I had in fact suggested a test of "reasonable in-
surability" (rather than "actual insurance" as Professor Morris sur-
mises) to help in establishing a firm insurance practice and thus to
facilitate a fixed and foreseeable choice of law. I must take the blame,
therefore, for having encouraged the search for an admittedly arbi-
trary, fixed choice of law by the consideration, apparently attributed
to Morris,40 that "it seems unreasonable to compel the host [whose car
is garaged in a guest statute state], as we do now, to buy insurance
against a liability that he might incur under the law of a [guest statute
state] possibly to be reached on a yet unplanned out-of-state trip.''41
35. Schneider v. Nichols, 280 Minn. 551, 158 N.W.2d 255 (1968). Here the common
law of the forum was applied in the forum resident's favor against the guest statute of
the place of accident on the ground that all the defendant's residence, and the car's
garage and insurance in the guest statute state all "add[ed] nothing to the case for
guest statute application either as to predictability of result..-." Id. at 158 N.W.2d 258.
This is in direct conflict with the Cipolla court's reasoning.
36. Cipolla v. Shaposka, supra note 13, at 856.
37. Id.
38. The court cites Morris, Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Process-The In-
significance of Foresight, 70 YALE L.J. 554, 574 (1961). See id. at 574-576.
39. See DICEY-MORRIs, A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND WITH REFERENCE TO THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS (8th ed. 1967) (Kahn-Freund), ch. 30 n.67. Cf. PIL 136.
40. Supra note 13, at 856.
41. Ehrenzweig, Products Liability in the Conflict of Laws, 69 YALE L.J. 794, 801
(1960), emphasis added. Shortly before the Cipolla case, the Supreme Court of New
Jersey had approved my reasoning. Pfau v. Trust Aluminum Co., 263 A.2d 129, 134 (N.J.
1970).
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But, contrary to the majority, and in accord with Morris,4 I would, in
the present case of a planned commuting trip, have found the guest's
claim under Pennsylvania law justified as "foreseeable and insurable."
5. Only Justice Roberts' dissenting views would have reached this
decision. But he, too, was forced to phrase his argument in that
fateful "interest" language which he, though for other purposes, had
introduced in his state.43 Being compelled to travel this route, he had
to resort to another novel tool in order to escape the result of the ma-
jority's weighing of "interests." He declared this result to be one of
"even balance," thus requiring an additional test. 4 But can we follow
Justice Roberts in his proposal that in such cases the court is simply
to apply the "better rule of law?"45 With due respect, we must point out
that the cases relied on by the Justice46 all treated this evaluation as
merely one of "the choice influencing considerations in conflicts law"
so ably propounded by Robert Leflar.47 I know of no court that has so
far treated this consideration as a rule of choice, and I submit that such
a rule would not only make us return to Magister Aldricus' 12th cen-
tury preconflicts law, 48 but would be entirely unworkable. Would
Justice Roberts, sitting in Delaware, have applied Pennsylvania law
to our facts as offering the better rule? Could he have done so without
ignoring the policy of his own state which alone can determine the
choice of law in the absence of established statutory or judicial rules
to the contrary?
We must sadly conclude that Brainerd Currie's finding of "conflict,
crisis, and confusion" in New York has now reached Pennsylvania. It
is our only hope that they will remain limited to those tort conflicts
rules which, as suggested earlier, are bound to remain unsatisfactory so
long as our tort laws remain those of the nineteenth century. And let
us hope that Pennsylvania will not follow New York in its gratuitous
excursions into other yet untouched areas of the law of conflict of laws.
42. "From the actuary's standpoint, therefore, these trips are foreseeable. . . As far
as [the defendant's] neighborhood is concerned those claims are foreseeable and insur-
able" [my phrase]. Id. at 576.
43. Supra note 12.
44. Cipolla v. Shaposka, supra note 13, at 859.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Leflar, Choice Influencing-Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.L. REv. 267,
295-304 (1966). Cf. PIL § 28; NUTSHELL § 8-7; REcUEIL §§ 26-28; Ehrenzweig, supra note
25.
48. According to him the judge's oath to decide "justly" imposed on him the obliga-
tion always to apply "the stronger and more useful" custom. See TREATISE 318.
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